When Aimpoint entered the competition for a US Army standard-issue combat optic in the 1990s, they really didn’t expect to win. The other finalists were Trijicon and Meprolite, and it seems like a safe bet that the American firm – Trijicon – would get the contract. However, it ended up going to Aimpoint’s CompM on both price and technical capability. This meant an order for 100,000 of the optics, requiring Aimpoint to massively scale up. It also led to a series of improvements to the design, which became the CompM2, CompM3, and CompM4.
Today, we are looking at the history of this evolution. How the Aimpoint 3000 became the Comp[etition], how the Comp was ruggedized to the CompM[ilitary], and how the Swedish Army Aimpoint CS led to the current CompM4.
I am surprised to learn these were adopted in the nineties. I deployed to Iraq in 2003 with a tank battalion in the 1st Infantry Division. We didn’t have any M68’s but would occasionally see them with other units (the 82nd and 1st Cav I think). I didn’t get to use one until circa 2010 in the National Guard.
Ian didn’t cover it, but when these were first adopted, they were part of the SOPMOD kits for the M4A1. You did not see them out in the wild for line units until well into the mid-2000s, much like the ACOG.
In my opinion, the sight systems that came out of the SOPMOD program were probably the most important innovation in US small arms of the late 20th Century, probably even ahead of adopting the M16 itself. The increase in terms of achieved hits were really that big a deal, presupposing that whoever had the rifle had been properly trained and had the sights properly zeroed.
I am of the further controversial opinion that the next big leap in small arms is not going to be either the basic weapon itself or sights, but in fire control and shared awareness. At some point in the near- or mid-term future, a squad in contact is going to have some form of fire coordination capability either built into its communication network or enabled through other means, and the leadership is going to be able to direct fires and prioritize targets as a part of their capability. This means that the squad will be able to mass fires, pass targets around, and generally allocate fires the way an ideal team would, but far more easily. It will probably be automated, to some degree, with AI assistance telling people which targets are the priority, while also meshing in fires from organic crew-served and external indirect fire.
This, in conjunction with drones, is going to mean that a fully-implemented squad-level system like I am projecting here is going to be exponentially more capable and destructive than even a full platoon is today.
It’s also going to be much more complex, and far more demanding of the individual soldier. You’re not going to be able to just hand a kid a rifle, right off the streets. I would guess that proficiency and integration with all the add-on systems is going to take a lot longer than even what we’re used to, and that getting the leadership up to speed and fully capable of using all the features of the systems will be a years-long endeavor. You’re going to have to pay these guys, and keep them happy, or resign yourself to simply having a somewhat more capable armed mob for your soldiery.
Please just go back to guns.
A few corrections:
The CompM2 has a 10,000 hour battery life on setting 7 of 10. 365 x 24 =8,760 hours. Basically one year battery life.
The US military procured over 280,000 CompM2s.
The CompM3 Advanced Electronic Circuitry Technology LED improved battery life to 50,000 hours on setting 7 of 10. Or basically five years.
CompM4 has an 80,000 hour battery life with a AA alkaline battery on 12 of 16 and with a Lithium AA battery it can last 10-15 years. The US military procured 339,000 CompM4 sights through three separate contracts (2006-2009) 565,000 CompM4S sights through an IDIQ contract in 2009.
I was the Aimpoint US Director of Military Business Development from 2007-2011.