Sweden was a remarkably early adopted of the light machine gun, for a nation not involved in World War One. Looking over the designs that existed right after the war, Sweden opted to purchase 700 (technically, 703) commercial BAR automatic rifles from Colt (by way of FN). These were configured to Swedish request, with substantial pistol grips, mid-mounted bipods, and chambered for the 6.5x55mm Swedish cartridge. This initial purchase was followed by a license to produce the guns domestically at the Carl Gustafs Stads factory in 1923, and another approximately 7500 were made by 1935.
In 1937, the design was modified to allow for a quick-change barrel, designated the m/37. Another 15,400 of these were built by 1944, and many oft he earlier m/21 guns updated to the new configuration. These would serve as Sweden’s standard support weapons until replaced by the FN MAG in the late 1950s, and remaining in limited service until the 1980s.
Project Lightening: overwhelming victory for the “magnificent” Lewis Gun in pretty much every category of practical field trials. BAR 4th place (tied with Chauchat behind the 50lb clunker ’08/15 and Rube Goldberg Madsen!), noted as not really a light machinegun.
Today: “[Lewis Gun] not necessarily the thing you want to adopt after the war”. “[BAR] clearly the best of the three guns.”
The Lewis was the best of the early LMGs. The BAR was a premature SWAG at an AK hampered by the lack of essential experience, doctrine, or technology. Had the Swedes invested a similar amount of engineering (QCB, box mag) in the Lewis, the gap would have become even wider.
I honestly can’t really agree with your take on the “best LMG”. Or, for that matter, that the BAR was an early attempt at an “Avtomat” or Sturmgewehr…
The Lewis was something of a success, true. However, it was also a weapon that possessed so many bizarre little “work-arounds” that Rube Goldberg was probably thinking about going after COL Lewis for copyright infringement. Outside of the Madsen LMG, the Lewis is probably the senior candidate for an Academy Award, in the “Most Complex Design that Somehow Works”.
I mean, for the love of God… A clockwork recoil spring!?!!?? Yeah, it works, but… Wow. Just… Wow.
As to the BAR being an early attempt at an Avtomat? Mmmm… No. They didn’t have the concept, and they didn’t have the supporting doctrine or mentality. Had you the ability to go back in time and tell the various “experts” running the world’s militaries back in the first half of the 20th Century that the “way of the future” was select-fire individual weapons handed out to everybody…? LOL. About all I can say is, you’d better have a solid “Get out of rubber-lined room at an asylum…” plan built into your time-travel planning. They’d have, at best, laughed you out of the room. These are people who thought that they needed to put a freakin’ magazine stop on their bolt-action rifles, to preclude Pvt. Johnny from “expending too much ammo at the enemy” with his manually-operated rifle. What on earth makes you think they’d have been able to wrap their heads around the idea of giving absolutely everyone fully-automatic fires…?
No, the BAR was the distillation of the ideas and concepts behind “Marching (or, as some had it, ‘Walking’…) Fire”. Give one or two guys per maneuver element an automatic weapon they could fire on the move (?!??) and hope they’d be able to suppress the enemy while they served as live pop-up targets. That’s why there was no bipod on the BAR they issued in WWI. Also, why that whole thing didn’t work out so well–The one thing that was missing from Project Lightening was return fire from downrange, or I dare say that Othais, May, and Ian would have found it a hell of a lot harder to even begin to make that concept look like it might work, or that it was remotely sensible.
“Fire while maneuvering” only works if you’re behind armor, have a stabilization system, and are shooting at the enemy with things whose calibers are measured in double-digits of millimeters. You’re doing infantry things, then it had better be “Fire AND maneuver…” as two separate related activities.
You can’t blame the folks fighting WWI for not figuring out the effects of then-new modern technology. It’s a lot like the idjits we have today, looking at Nagorno-Karabakh and going “Wow, those drones sure are interesting…” while failing to comprehend the implications or even begin to deal with them rationally.
If I were to say anything about the Swedish BAR, I’d have to say that it’s a lot more “right” for early and mid-20th Century war than the original or later American BAR. But, it’s still lacking. Bottom-fed? No tripod adaptability? It’s not an LMG; it’s an Automatic Rifle adapted for reality. The entire base concept is still sucky, but it’s better than what we Americans did.
The BREN is probably the best LMG from the mid-century; it got into wide enough use that it had impact, it was reliable, and it could serve in the LMG and Automatic Rifle roles fairly interchangeably. Had they stuck a belt feed on that thing, it would have been almost perfect, but, hey… Who really understood war as she was fought, on the Allied side? At least, at the basic level of infantry and damn near nothing else.
Ammunition supply would also probably have been a problem for anyone prescient enough to develop and issue an early-20th Century Avtomat. I don’t think that anyone out there could have possibly been able to commit to and maintain the numbers necessary for that sort of production, not with sufficient precision and consistency to make something like an AK or StG44 work for truly mass issue. By mid-century, the Americans could do it, maybe… But, we really don’t know, for sure–The amount of high-pressure .30-06 they were able to get into combat is only a drop in the bucket compared to what we now know is required for you to do really large-scale infantry combat with nothing but assault rifles. Were you to tell an Army logistician of 1938 that we’d be routinely expending nearly 50,000 rounds per enemy casualty generated, the poor bastard would probably have wet himself. By Vietnam, that sort of thing was accepted without even blinking… “Oh, well… Better lay on a few more container ships, eh?”.
Concepts and supporting technology weren’t there. It was not the moment for someone to just leapfrog things to a late-20th Century solution.
Although, I do have to admit… It would have been interesting to watch the ensuing trainwreck. I’ve often wondered if Allied victory in WWII couldn’t be ascribed to some idiot Wehraboo with a time machine going back and telling the Nazis all about all the just-out-of-reach but unattainable high tech crap, and convincing them to try and build all of it. There’s the seed of a good tragicomedy in that idea, I think…
A clockwork recoil spring!?!!??
Irrespective of your further reasoning, the Coil spring is in terms of volume/stored energy ratio well ahead of other springs. Think what extra space (and mass of receiver to house it in) would occupy conventional helical spring.
First, the Lewis. Simplicity is important, but it’s important to balance it with functionality. The core Lewis operating system (oprod post cams bolt into battery and then drives the firing pin into the primer) is the essence of simplicity. Some of its peripherals are complex, but for reasons that made sense in the 1910s.
The magazine is complicated, but a decent solution to feed 47-94 rounds in an era of imprecise spring tempering. Its pawl system is like a belt-fed’s (but simpler than some). Replace it with a simple stamped housing for a box mag (as I suggested), and nearly all the complexity goes away
The clock spring seems crazy today, but added the function of adjustability. If you don’t need that, not only is it feasible to replace it with a coil compression spring in the oprod, but Lewis himself did just that in his pistol version.
Speaking of proportionality, you used an a lot of words to explain “hampered by the lack of essential experience, doctrine, or technology” to THE GUY WHO SAID IT IN THE FIRST PLACE. Granted, some of them served the additional “functions” of being condescending and sarcastic
I never meant to imply that the guys who spec’d the BAR contemplated the (again, later) idea of issuing them to everybody. OTOH, they weren’t using “automatic rifle” in the later “closest approximation of an LMG we’re gonna get” sense either. As you said, they were talking about “walking fire” – which I agree is a terrible idea for all the reasons you mentioned.
“(…)Replace it with a simple stamped housing for a box mag(…)”
Lewis himself used box magazine in his Assault Phase Rifle which unsuccessfully competed against Browning Automatic Rifle
Box-magazine feed version was developed by Soley Arms around 1939, see 1st photo from top: https://collections.royalarmouries.org/object/rac-object-277355.html
Very cool, thanks!
Also, I had meant to add a smiley after “sarcastic” in my previous post.
I didn’t mean to come across as attacking what you were saying, just that I really disagree that there were any real contenders for “bestest LMG” back then. All of them were feeling their way forward, and they all got at least one element or more of the “LMG equation” wrong. It wasn’t until the Chatellerault that we start to see real forward progress.
And, even then? I think the entire idea of the LMG is really somewhat flawed, in terms of addressing actual combat needs. The issue is that you need real sustained heavy fires to do enough damage or provide enough suppression in order to maneuver and kill the enemy–Especially the way most American and NATO units do it, these days. The idea that the guns are just there to support maneuver is the sticking point–If you’re going to be blasting your way onto the objective, then you’d better be doing it with a friggin’ belt-fed in a caliber that’s going to be able to penetrate and carry far enough to make it work.
I’m of the opinion that if you’re going to take the Marine approach, and do it with jumped-up assault rifles, then you’d better be planning on a lot of very complex and elegant sneaking and peeking before even more well-planned combat actions taken solely with those little itty-bitty M27s. If you’re going to continue on with the usual “Hey-diddle-diddle, straight down the middle…” approach so beloved of combat assault troops everywhere, you’re rapidly going to discover that you can’t dominate a fight against fixed MG positions or even begin to suppress them. The Marines had better be damn good at playing tactical ninjas, or they’re going to wind up dying in job lots.
I think, based on experience and a lot of research over the years, that the superior solution to the issues of “what small arms are best for modern combat” is that you need to have a mix, and a part of that mix has got to be a solid sustained-fire solution for your MG. You can’t do it with a freakin’ magazine-fed weapon–That’s been proven time and time again, with the L86 and the RPK. Those weapons are basically just better Automatic Rifles than the issued compromise individual weapons, and they can’t produce the volume, accuracy, or the repeatability of an actual support weapon. There are also the issues of “individual vs. crew-served”, which are not at all insignificant or immaterial; a weapon manned by a team is always going to be more effective and more productive than something hauled around the battlefield by just one guy that’s all too prone to the vices inherent to individual operations.
Supposing you could get a magazine-fed weapon in a real supporting caliber that had a capacity equivalent to a belt…? Maybe you could make one work. Absent that, I’m going to plump down for a belt-fed, every time. The GPMG concept just makes too much damn sense, and I would present the idea that the key features there are not just the ones everyone focuses on, but the fact that the belt feed system allows for extensive firing sessions without interruption, and less distractions on the gunner. When you’ve got your AG reaching over across your sight plane to change mags for you, that takes away your ability to keep track of what’s going on downrange, and it also makes it a lot more likely that you’re not going to be able to take advantage of those fleeting glimpses you get of the enemy. This is why the BREN is an inferior tactical tool, compared to the MG34/42 in the LMG role, assuming you’re not using the Doppeltrommel and having to change mags on that…
Part of what always aggravates me about these discussions is that most “firearms enthusiasts” are strictly focused on the mechanisms and the “cool”, rather than the “how was this thing used…?” issues. Granted, it ain’t exactly likely that a realistic MG range or equivalent to the IPSC is ever going to be popular, but it does yike me when I see these things discussed in the vacuum of “gun by itself”. You don’t really begin to “get” why the freakin’ Germans were so much more lethal with their gun systems until you look at the whole package from the spare parts kits to the “irrelevant accessories” like the binoculars and range finders they issued. Once you’ve spent a half-hour fumbling around trying to get a situation going for an American-issue M122 tripod to be able to deliver fire at over 800m in random rugged terrain, you begin to appreciate the adaptability and flexibility of those “overly heavy” Lafette tripods the Germans put under the MG34/42 family. And, when you’ve got access to real tools, like a set of binos with a reticle and you’ve got a rangefinder…? Man, you begin to grasp why it was they managed to wreak such havoc with their guns.
The MG is a system. Period. The gun is just a part of it, and I would suggest that it might not even be the most important part–The biggest and most important part of the gun system’s effectiveness stems from the crew and their training. The bits and bobs that the various armies hand out don’t really mean squat until you have them in the hands of men who know what they’re about, and how best to conduct what amounts to mass murder at extended ranges.
It’s something you should never lose sight of: The MG is purely and simply put, a killing tool. Distilled essence of infantry–A modern MG gunner has control over a quantity of firepower that was once strictly the purview of a company or even battalion commander, should you go back far enough. As such, the gun crew needs to be able to effectively target and control that fire as though he were that company or battalion commander, which means that, yes, they need things like binoculars and so forth, just like the LT does.
You would not believe how few binos are on issue in a lot of American units, and how few of them are actually issued out or carried by the gun crews or their immediate leadership. Then, too, there’s the minor fact that few of the ones who do carry them know how to use them in conjunction with their tripods and T&E mechanisms… It’s truly a lost art.
I agree with pretty much everything in your response, and wasn’t bothered by your previous one either (the disappearing emoji made my offhand comments look harsher than I intended). I enjoy learning from your practical experience and analytical viewpoint – a rare combination indeed!
I especially agree with your concept of MGs as systems of systems, the critical context of mission / doctrine, and your preference for belt feed and sustained fire. My own background is naval, and post-9/11 I saw the force throw lots of money (and very little thought) at CSW. They took a cookie-cutter “ground guys are the gun guys” approach without the least consideration for WHY the Army or Marines had made particular choices. Everything is a tradeoff until it isn’t. A good way to guarantee Wrong Answers is to copy off someone else’s version of the test – i.e. to accept a product package whose disadvantages remain while its “advantages” are geared towards a mission having little or nothing to do with one’s own. Now that the pendulum has swung away, the likelihood of fixing anything is even lower.
One counterpoint – not a practical disagreement, but more of a general observation / background on what I wrote previously. The nature of technological progress (largely synthesis and development of the best features, and rejection of “others”) makes practically every early-generation product look awful by subsequent standards. Maxim’s post-prototype MMGs are almost unique (not just among guns, but inventions in general) in being competitive through several decades of innovation. I still think it’s beneficial to compare old products by the standards of their times, and especially useful to contrast them with their contemporaries, without anachronism in either direction.
Hmmm… in support of your “GPMG liturgy” I have to say what I heard (and that is really a long time ago) from my granpa who survived both wars and was actively involved in the First one against Italy. I remember he said as they were before the “sturm” sniffing out where Italians had they MGs dug in. That was the tool they could spot, not howitzers 10 kilometers behind the front.
Now, that WAS and to some degree still is a valid point. However, did you units in Nam come under automatic grenade-launcher fire? You know, those Rusky-pesky things which can be handled by one man? They are light with awesome firepower; ‘area weapons’ as they call it now. How do you want to face them in the upcoming war with your safe-in-place GPMG? Then, your stuck-on-spot M240B plus ammo and tripod with 25kg combined weight will not be much worth. OR, am I wrong?
You HAVE GOT be on move, otherwise you are dead meat. Or, even better, do not start the war in first place. Nothing ‘personal’ you understand me I hope.
See, Denny, that’s the thing: The tripod is not a stationary tool. You don’t set one up and stay there. Or, at least, if you do, you’re a fool.
The tripod is a necessary tool to get accurate fires from an MG delivered consistently past the range where a bipod is effective. You can’t do the things that an MG can do without one, because you’re spreading the rounds all over hell’s creation.
There was a German training film from WWII that I watched where a gun team from an Alpenjager unit was shown operating in the mountains. They were moving up a valley, and observed an enemy element moving on the other side of that valley. Orders issued, and bam… Within less than a minute, the MG34 is on the tripod and they’re ranging the enemy. First burst goes out, the NCOIC starts issuing commands in mils, and the gunners are working the gun dropping rounds everywhere the NCOIC is observing movement in the rocks through his binoculars. You can’t do that sort of thing without a tripod and binoculars/rangefinders working in unison.
The gun is merely a part of the system, and without the rest, it’s mostly just a lot of loud noises delivering nothing really effective. Every time I see someone operating without a tripod and the rest of the stuff you need, all I can think, contemptuously, is “Amateurs…”.
I know Kirk,
the real soldier is “machine-gun” soldier. That’s the way it is. If you were serving with different unit/ equipment it would be your “horse” too. Much appreciate your notes. All the best to you!
i am most of the time just a silent reader and watcher of FW for many years.
Beside Ian´s great work, I like reading here and find some nice ideas.
@MG on Tripod Topic: here is a video called “fire and movment” which shows some training in the Bundeswehr https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_x4SBuTDBDM
Here you see, how mobile a MG 3 on a Lafette could be. Yeah they mad mistakes and at the end they were listed by the observers.
Also like Ian often said and Kirk here too, should not be judged just alone, but by there time, design goals, doctrine and limitation of the country.
Furthermore, you need to see the whole set of weapons in a battalion or bigger. A single squad or platoon will rarley attack or defend a position alone. Beside some special force in low/mid-tense conflicts.
“(…)Lewis was the best of the early LMGs”
This contradict what French Section Technique de l’Artillerie detected in 1920…1923 after many tests of light machine guns(…)The tests had shown that the Browning Automatic Rifle was the best of all the guns presented.
“(…)Lewis was the best of the early LMGs”
Also, best for whom? One set of requirements might promote Lewis, whilst other set might promote other pattern.
Best for the widely agreed upon functions of an LMG (with benefit of hindsight). The BAR was better for the imaginary concept of “walking fire”.
If I righr, the thing that hampered seriously the BAR in project Lightening was just the absence of a bipod.
And also if you are a goverment looking for some thousands of LMG, the insanely high price of the Lewis is something to think about.
I wouldn’t say “just”. BAR scored low in categories having nothing to do with the bipod.
The high price for the Lewis had a lot to do with the complex magazine feed, which I recommended replacing in my original comment.
There is one other BAR version. The Bonnie and Clyde chopped down BAR. I am having one built from an old group registered receiver. It should be a dragon to shoot
A theft from the Missouri National Guard
More than just that one, for example polish pattern 37(so called “Puppy”), upside down BAR – just like FN MAG – with a pan magazine.
And I bet it isn’t only one left.
Excellent briefing. I first learned of the Swedish BAR in 1997, very impressed. With a decent optic, would this weapon have performed well as a rapid-fire sharpshooter?
“(…)would this weapon have performed well as a rapid-fire sharpshooter”
Note that Kg m/21 is firing from open bolt, so I would not except that it would perform well in that role.
When I look at this I can see how wise Swedes were and continue to be when it comes to small arms (in addition of excelling in other technologies). Instead of spending lavishly on new systems they smartly used what they got with practical improvements/ upgrades. Case in point is their version of G3 rifle with new buttstock and optical sight mount.
Interestingly there was domestic designed Swedish machine gun namely Fm/Kjellman
and proved too expensive to make: The arm was very reliable but to expensive to produce. The production was limited to only 10 weapons!
“Rapid-fire sharpshooter” from an open bolt BAR?
You’re probably kidding…
Fewer than BAR, in the Great War, people were killed only with stones.
However, there was still Chauchat. LOL
This is a means of fire support and squad suppression. Suitable only for creating VISIBILITY (more precisely, audibility 😉 ) of the presence of a machine gun, which would allow the squad to get out of the shelling or, on the contrary, come closer to throw a hand grenade.
That is, it is rather an “automatic carnival clapper”.
Similar to Chauchat or AVS/AVT, designed to compensate for the lack of normal machine guns.
You might want to consider the 4mm Carl Gustaf, the Swedes have madea nice pile selling and licensing that innovative weapon around the world. If you want real innovation, check out the S-tank
Also SAAB J35 was aerodynamic-wise unorthodox for time it was developed it.
Proved to be export success (was sold to Switzerland).
Sorry, but no. The Swiss bought another delta-winged fighter instead, the French Dassault Mirage III. The Draken was exported to Danemark, Finland and Austria.
Right I should wrote Austria, not Switzerland.
Oh yes, the ‘monitor’ BAR marketed to law enforcement.
Is any safety NOT intended to prevent accidental discharge? I do wonder about the two-hand requirement, is the extra security worth the possible hitch?
I’ve always liked Ian Hogg’s idea for the “shoulda been” US Rifle Squad of WW2
Squad Leader (SGT) M1 Rifle
2 Scouts M1A1 or M3A1 Submachine Gun substitute Trench Guns if desired in jungle or extensively wooded terrain like Scandinavia (I woulda liked to have gotten my Uncle Lee’s opinion – he was a scout with 11th Airborne Division in the Pacific, but died of wounds in August 1945)
Grenadier M1 Rifle with Grenade Launcher
Light Machine Gun Team
Gunner M1 30-06 Bren
Assistant-Ammo Bearer M2 Carbine
Assistant Squad leader(CPL) M1 Rifle
3 Riflemen M1 Rifle
I have to agree that the Bren is superior to the BAR
Note that every man has what is now known as a “Ranger Buddy” – we got it from the British Commandos where he was known as “Yer Mate”
Duckin and runnin for cover
It’s an opinion, but it is mine–I think the US Marine rifle squad did it better, and with a more versatile structure. 13 men, three four-man fire teams, all structured the same way with a BAR in each team.
The concept of the Army “way”, with specialized recon and other teams…? Not a fan; give me three independent groups capable of “doing it all”, and I’ll be a lot happier. You never know when you’re going to lose men, and it’s a lot easier to re-purpose a generalist than it is to do that with a specialist. The Army’s idea of “Scout, Rifleman, AR team” is not one that I’m a fan of. With the Marine structure, you’re able to do a one-up, two back when you’re feeling for enemy locations, or do a two-up, one back for those times when you’re less concerned about contact. You can also do full-blown three-team abreast sweeps when you need to, and be able to re-direct focus as needed. With the “Army way”, you have to choose what you’re going to do, and if you get it wrong as to where you’re going to need your supporting fire, you’re hosed.
I’d also want to have an attached belt-fed, as dictated by necessity, along with dedicated mortars at platoon level.
Perhaps, with some skill, this safety can be turned off with one hand.
But in general, inconvenient safety do not increase the preparation time for weapons to fire.
Because they are simply not used.
The Norwegians had at least some 6.5×55-mm Lewis Guns. Certainly the Dutch had their M1920 in the rimmed 6.5×53-mmR cartridge caliber.
The author of the gotavapen.se site recalled still using the m/1921 automatic rifle in his artillery military service in the early 1970s!
Note from his article that Sweden wanted to make a better WWII LMG/automatic rifle since the M/1921 was used as a self-loading rifle mostly, much like the British Home Guard sensibly did with theirs given the 20-rd. magazine and fixed barrel. Desiring to use the same production machinery, they managed the m/1937 that had a quick-detach barrel. Not bad given the limited arms industry and “need for speed” with WWII brewing… Consider that U.S. Ordnance wanted to build the post-WWII service rifle using the old Garand production plant designed by John C. Garand before he retired and came up with the M14, another lesson perhaps in “false economy?”
Note too there were experiments with the 6.5x55mm BAR being adapted to belt-feed, although of course Sweden opted for the 7.62x51mm and got a belt-fed BAR in that caliber in the FN MAG-58…
The AK4 or G3 was relegated for a time to dedicated urban warfare troops under the notion that the 7.62x51mm would penetrate light cover better than the 5.56x45mm AK5 (FN FNC), and given over to the Home Guard. Then it was revamped with Aimpoint red dot sights and snazzy Spuhr stock furniture. Many are being handed over to the Estonian Home Guard, in an effort to make the Baltic States look like the makings of a real asymmetric mess should the Russians opt to re-annex them. Members who acquire these gifted ex-Swedish service rifles are encouraged to hide them in secret caches and so on.
“…designed by John C. Garand before he retired and came up with the M14..”(C)
Should this be understood as “John Garand designed the M14 rifle”?..
Given what I’ve read, the Browning M1918 and all its variants would suffice for mobile fire support for a recon squad, but if you wanted to DOMINATE the field, give every platoon a belt-fed machine gun and actually TRAIN the crew on professional machine-gunnery (rangefinders/binoculars, portable tripod, and obvious mathematics included), not “cut-and-paste your rifleman skills” nor “SPRAY UNTIL THE MACHINE GUN BREAKS.” I could be wrong.
Here is a quote from what i think is the current US Army manual on the M249 series Light Machine Gun (from chapter 5, Employment):
“The light machine gunner’s primary role is to engage the enemy with well-aimed bursts. The light machine gunner is the subject matter expert for employment of the light machine gun, and advises the rifle squad leader of the best way to employ the light machine gun. (Refer to ATP 3-21.8 for more information.)
Consistently hitting a target with precision is a complex interaction of factors occurring immediately before, during, and after the round fires. The interactions include maintaining postural steadiness, establishing and maintaining the proper aim on the target, stabilization of the weapon while pressing the trigger, and adjusting for environmental and battlefield conditions.”
The Army publication ATP 3-21.8 (“INFANTRY PLATOON AND SQUAD”) referenced can be found at:
ATP 3-21.8 has a whole section on Machine Gun Employment, for example in the sub-section on MACHINE GUNS IN THE DEFENSE there is:
“M249 LIGHT MACHINE GUN IN THE DEFENSE
F-150. In the defense, the M249 adds increased firepower without the addition of manpower. Characteristically, M249s are light, fire rapidly, and have more ammunition than the rifles in the squad they support. Under certain circumstances, the platoon leader may designate the M249 machine gun as a platoon crew-served weapon.”
and a longer passage on the M240 series, starting with:
“M240-SERIES MEDIUM MACHINE GUNS IN THE DEFENSE
F-151. In the defense, the medium machine gun provides sustained direct fires covering the most likely or most dangerous enemy dismounted avenues of approach. It protects friendly units against the enemy’s dismounted close assault. The platoon leader positions his machine guns to concentrate fires in locations where he wants to inflict the most damage to the enemy. He also places them where they can take advantage of grazing enfilade fires, stand-off or maximum engagement range, and best observation of the target area. Machine guns provide overlapping and interlocking fires with adjacent units and cover tactical and protective obstacles with traversing or searching fires. When FPFs are called for, machine guns (aided by M249 fires) place a barrier of fixed, direct fire across the platoon or squad front.
Excellent video! I do think it was a little mix up with the fire selector, ”P” in swedish military nomenclature stands for ”
”patronvis” =semi automatic and ”A” stands for automatisk= full auto.