Enjoying Black Powder Episode 5: The Remington Rolling Block

The full version with hand loading information (not permitted on YouTube) is available here:
https://forgottenweapons.vhx.tv/videos/black-powder-ep-5-app

Black powder military rifles of the 1860s-1880s are a really enjoyable group of guns. A lot of them are relatively reasonably priced, and they are actually pretty easy to reload for. The unavailability of factory ammunition (for most, although not so much for the Trapdoor) makes them seem like a daunting prospect, but for a pretty simple investment in tools and time one can make up ammunition and have a lot of fun with rifles like this.

That’s the idea behind a new series here on black powder military rifles. Each month, my friend – and handloader – Tom and I will take out a different model to have some fun at the range and compare how they handle. And then we will show you how to make the ammunition for them. So grab your pith helmet, pause “Zulu” and join us! Today is Episode Three: the Remington Rolling Block!

21 Comments

  1. Compare the ejecting of unhappy spent cases for the Remington rolling block to the Springfield trap door.

    What I am getting at is the archeological evidence from the Little Big Horn battle where split cases and heating up of the barrel caused the trapdoor cavalry carbines that Custer’s forces used to not eject the spent cases. What has been found on the battlefield is evidence of knives being used to try to pry out a stuck case. This rendered the carbine useless and helped to lead to the demise of many troopers.

    What would be informational is to do rapid fire of 50 to 70 rounds and see if the Remington still ejects properly.

    • “(…)used to not eject the spent cases(…)”
      This is surprising as trials which resulted in choice of said weapon https://github.com/openirons/1872USArmyRifleTrialsTestCriteria/blob/main/1872%20Test%20Criteria.md stipulated
      Defective cartridges – A fresh piece of white paper marked with the number of the gun [will be] laid over the breech to observe the escape of gas, if any occurs [for each of the following three tests]. Each gun to be fired once with each of the following defective cartridges:

      Cross-filed on head to nearly the thickness of the metal.
      Cut at intervals around the rim.
      With a longitudinal cut the whole length of the cartridge from the rim up.

      “(…)would be informational is to do rapid fire of 50 to 70 rounds and see if the Remington still ejects properly.(…)”
      This would required cartridge as used back then to yield useful result, as according to https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-little-bighorn-were-the-weapons-the-deciding-factor/ Model 1873 carried by the 7th Cavalry was a carbine that weighed 7 pounds and had an overall length of 41 inches. It used a .45-caliber copper-cased cartridge, a 405-grain bullet and a charge of 55 grains of black powder. (Cuprum has different mechanical properties than brass currently used, further examination would be required to determine minimal/maximal dimensions of chamber/case as used, as said weapon was adopted for service before standard of Commission internationale permanente pour l’épreuve des armes à feu portatives were established)

      • From the posted G. Michno article: ” The contention that the Springfields suffered from a significant number of extractor failures was not borne out. Only about 2 percent of the recovered specimens showed evidence of extractor problems.”

        • There is nothing that Custer could have done differently or being armed differently that would have changed the outcome, considering his battle plan. Maybe following orders to wait until Terry arrived to engage the Indians would have helped. Maybe not dividing his command and making sure the pack train was caught up with the main body of the regiment before attacking would have helped. Even then, I would think the best outcome of a solitary attack would have been an orderly retreat with fewer casualties. But in the end, the number of Indians he was facing could never be overcome.

          But I think 2% failures seems really bad, considering we are talking about a do-or-die hard fought battle. I will let you be the 2% trooper that looses his ability to defend himself. But I will will stand by my question about whether this rate of failure would be more/less with the rolling block. What was the limits of the period technology?

          • Custer made the mistake of thinking he was fighting half-hard Confederates who weren’t really all that invested in winning the fight, as opposed to tribesmen whose women and children were near at hand and in danger.

            I dare say that if the average Confederate trooper that Custer had fought in the Civil War had been encountered in similar circumstances, he’d have had his ass handed to him in a similar manner… Stakes were a lot higher on the High Plains, the Indians knew that, and so… That’s largely why they were so motivated. Custer’s reputation with the Indians didn’t help matters, anyway: They knew that defeat likely meant really bad things were going to happen to them.

            I used to work with a guy who was fascinated by Little Big Horn. You could sit down at lunch with him and get one hell of an education on the battle, and I learned a lot. His opinion was that the 7th Cavalry under Custer was not “fit for purpose”, in that they’d never really had to fight against a truly committed opponent; most of their experience was on the order of constabulary rather than actual outright fighting to the death, and it showed at Little Big Horn. Like as not, most of the world’s cavalry at that point would have gone down similarly, and maybe the only ones that wouldn’t have were the Russian Cossacks and some of the Turkish Arab auxiliaries (most of whom wouldn’t have gone into the fight in the first damn place, being more sensible than Custer).

            After getting their hand burnt off, metaphorically speaking, the US Army got a lot more cautious about dealing with the “Indian problem”, and became a lot less prone to rushing confidently into battle with large numbers of them.

            Custer was someone who should never have been in command; he was more of a politician and “political operator” than he was a general. His arrogance and over-confidence are what got him killed along with his command.

            At least, that’s my opinion. The weapons they were carrying were a small part of the “why they were defeated”, and I’d wager that even if you’d had the two sides swap weapons and keep their numbers, the results would have been very close to the same.

    • The big find at the Little Bighorn after several seasons of archaeological field work was that the Native Americans/ Indians had over a two-to-one *firearm* superiority in addition to the awesome numerical superiority that they also had on that occasion. The battle was over relatively quickly. All manner of firearms were used, from smooth-bore muskets and muzzle loaders to metallic cartridge repeaters, but the passel of single-shot Civil War-era carbines like Sharps, and especially the lever-action Henry, improved Henry/ Winchester 66s, Spencers, and even a few Winchester 73s were plentiful enough to overwhelm the troopers with single-shot trapdoor carbines, even if most of the Indians retained the bow.

      • The Springfield, even with the .45-55-405 carbine load, was superior to pretty much anything but a .50-70 at long range. But the fight here was at extremely short range, where rate of fire counted for more than the ability to hit a running buffalo 300 yards out.

        It’s also believed that Custer used the same sort of tactics he’d been accustomed to in the Civil War a decade or so earlier. But then, his cavalry had been armed with Spencer repeating carbines, not single-shot Springfields, against Confederate units armed primarily with single-shot muzzleloaders. You might say that at the Greasy Grass, the shoe was on the other foot.

        Whether the Springfields malfunctioned or not (and even when it worked perfectly the “Trapdoor” was dangerous to its user), this was a fight which the side armed primarily with single-shot rifles was not going to win.

        clear ether

        eon

    • To the extent the ejection was an issue at Little Big Horn, wasn’t that also an issue of copper casing instead of Brass casings?
      The issue at Little Big Horn was failure in judgement, reconnaissance and tactics, not to mention

      • To the extent the ejection was an issue at Little Big Horn, wasn’t that also an issue of copper casing instead of Brass casings?
        The issue at Little Big Horn was failure in judgement, reconnaissance and tactics, not to mention basic failures in tactics and frankly IMHO courage of at least one other commander.

  2. Hooray! My favorite.

    Mine’s a .43 Spanish/ 11.15x58mmR version made at Ilion, NY by Remington, then sold to Argentina. Eventually, it was then sold back to the USA, after being blued and having the stock filled in with wood putty and so on. Lost out on a few auctions for others.

    I love the action. Someday I might get a 7x57mm version. The made-for-France WWI-era version in 8x50mmR is nifty, but way too expensive. The Swedish versions were relatively widely available for a good long while, mostly in the 8x58mmR cartridge, and a few others in the black-powder cartridge.

  3. Daweo — Interesting looking book. The presence of the Gatling guns would have forced Custer to come up with a different battle plan, if he went full in and used them. What he choose to do stank. Custer might not have achieved the larger goal of the whole expedition, that being of forcing the Indians onto the reservations. But maybe he would have survived the conflict with fewer casualties.

    • I’m going to go out on a limb and assert that even if Custer had taken the Gatling guns with him, odds are excellent that they’d have had zero-to-no effect on what happened.

      At the time, nobody really had a clue about what the guns could do, or how to use them. Given that Custer was more politician than military theorist or expert, I doubt that he’d have come up with a workable means of utilizing that firepower, and that the far more likely outcome of “Custer takes Gatlings with him” would be the capture of the guns still on the mules carrying them by the Indians… Who might, being entirely unconventional in terms of military thought, have managed a better use for them.

      I can’t remember where the hell I read it, but there’s a short story or something out there that’s a historical counterfactual about Little Big Horn and its aftermath, wherein the Indians capture the Gatlings and their ammunition, along with a guy who knew how to “make them roar”, which then played into the rest of the force Custer was with getting whacked in a box canyon near Little Big Horn, after the Indians lured them into it.

      Wish I could remember where I saw it, because it was really well-done, and quite historically accurate so far as I could tell… The “guy” the Indians co-opted was a historical figure, a civilian contractor I believe, who was on record as a bit of an Indian sympathizer and who had good reason to be disaffected.

      I really don’t think those Gatlings would have done Custer a damn bit of good; folly, once that course is set, is difficult to avoid.

    • No. The rolling block breech looks like this inside;

      https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/22/Remington_Rolling_Block.jpg

      And in resisting breech pressure and recoil force it works like this;

      https://i.postimg.cc/rmwRVDMY/Rolling-Block-Action.jpg

      The red arrow shows the direction the breech and hammer locking system redirects the “thrust” of the case-head against the breech face.

      The breast of the hammer underneath the rear cove of the breechblock is what keeps the breech shut when firing.

      So, no, the only way to cock the rolling block is to thumb-cock the hammer first (which frees the breechblock to rotate), then “roll” the breechblock backward on its pivot pin. Hence “rolling block”.

      When you pull the trigger, the hammer rotates forward to hit the firing pin and simultaneously rotates its breast under the rear of the breechblock. This is how the rolling block locks instantly as it fires. IIRC, it is the only single-shot action in history with such an instantaneous lockup.

      If it did not work in exactly that way, it would be able to fire with the breech unlocked. Not a good thing to have happen.

      clear ether

      eon

        • A cook-off can happen even with modern-day smokeless propellants. The HK53 (the 5.56 x 45mm version of the MP5) is noted for this after about two magazines’ worth have been run through it on full-auto.

          But that’s in self-loading actions with rates of fire (and thus rates of heat buildup) far greater than any manually-operated repeating action, let alone a single-shot.

          Even allowing that black powder is more heat-sensitive than smokeless powder (and it is, OMG is it ever), I’m not sure anybody could “work” any manual repeater quite fast enough to heat up the chamber enough to cause even black powder to “cook off”. And even the rolling block, one of the fastest-repeat-firing single shots ever designed, probably couldn’t either.

          The single biggest temperature problem with rapid fire in any black-powder rifle?

          Not getting blisters on the fingers of your “off” hand.

          clear ether

          eon

  4. Kirk — Custer excelled during the Civil War at classic European Cavalry battles. Indian warfare was a different beast that took the whole of the army to figure out how to fight.

    Custer got away with the approach of a mad charge into a village at the Battle of the Washita. He thought that he could pull this off again because he did not listen to his Native scouts and felt that the encampment did not contain that many Indians.

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