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Today I am joined by Henry Chan of 9 Hole Reviews for the monthly Q&A – enjoy!
00:00 – Intro
00:34 – Kyrö sponsorship
02:14 – What is Henry’s take on the M7/M8 platform, and where does he think US Army small arms ought to focus on?
17:10 – Why aren’t more GunTubers at matches?
25:40 – Would Henry do Practical Accuracy video(s) on the .50 BMG?
33:50 – How have our relations with manufacturers, curators, collectors, etc changed over the years?
39:24 – What guns we’ve filmed have been the most surprisingly good and bad?
55:08 – What would each of us be doing if YouTube hadn’t worked out?
I laud what Henry Chan is saying here, but… I don’t think he “gets” it, either.
There’s a lunatic focus here, on the individual weapon. It reeks of the fascination with the sword, back in the days before firearms: The sword was the weapon of the leadership, the elite; the pole arm was the primary and most effective actual weapon issued to the soldier doing the actual fighting, yet nobody ever really wanted to spend a lot of time studying or romanticizing them
The reality is that the weapons doing the majority of the actual killing are not the modern-day equivalent of the sword, the overly-romanticized individual weapon, but by the supporting arms like machineguns, mortars, and drones.
Because of this factor, the entire discussion and thought process surrounding individual weapons is warped past all utility and discussion. As Ian rightly points out, the sight-range facts are out there: You’re not going to even get targets past 300m often enough to make them worthwhile, and the further reality is that those targets past that range band need to be addressed as area targets, not individual point targets.
That’s how you make war, as opposed to running a target match on a range.
People lose sight of what “making war” actually consists of. It is not a show of prowess between two champions out in front of their armies, nor is it a show of marksmanship prowess. It is sheer, unadulterated murder on an industrial scale, and when you forget that? You lose lives, treasure, and the war itself.
I feel safe in asserting that if you were to take an organization trained and equipped in the manner I would advise, to cold-heartedly murder the enemy as quickly and efficaciously as possible, and put it up against the current mentality wherein the idjits want the emphasis on killing individual targets out there in the great beyond?
I guarantee you that the former is going to be ruling the battlespace, which is going to be filled with the cold dead bodies of the latter. You do not win modern war by way of the “noble marksman”, you win modern war by coldly analyzing where the killing power actually is, and applying it as effectively as possible. The rifleman lost primacy in that arena sometime back around when massing infantry to conduct volley fire became untenable.
Deal with it. That’s reality. Today’s infantry is an arm that exists solely to provide close-in fire and security for the actual killing tools like the forward observe, the machinegun team, the mortar crews, and the drone operators. They don’t have a “primary arm” purpose any more, and haven’t for about the last hundred years. They’re an important part of the combined arms team, but they’re not the primary one any more.
Supposedly, that was the classical Greek and Persian model for “real war”, as with Achilles and Hector in The Iliad.
But we only have Homer’s word for that. Hell, we only have Homer’s word that anybody involved was even a Greek.
The spear, pike, or whatever you want to call it, became the most effective weapon on the field because of tactics. Every mook in the phalanx knew that his ass was grass if he didn’t keep in step with everybody else. The “flanking” maneuver was apparently invented when some smart guy (maybe Epaminondas of Thebes?) noticed that a phalanx always made a quarter-turn to the right as it advanced because everybody had his shield on his left arm. He proceeded to beat the Thracians’ and Spartans’ asses like a gong because he took advantage of this with what amounted to a right cross.
Then the Roman legions figured out that their infantry with the gladius could break up a pike square by basically going Pier Six Brawl on same.
The pike square finally pretty much died when gunpowder came along. First with artillery, and then the arquebus. The French should probably still be cursing Gonzalo de Cordoba.
Tactics tend to follow what you’re fighting with. It just has to wait for the soldiery to figure out how to use it correctly, never mind the theory in the manual.
A German general in WW2 (von Seeckt?) reputedly said that studying American doctrine was pointless because American soldiers felt under no compulsion to follow it. Americans, rather, were masters of the twin TV Tropes of the Indy Ploy and Xanatos Speed Chess, q.v.
When America troops fought according to “doctrine”, the result was usually something like Anzio. Which was Montgomery’s brainstorm and nearly permanently fucked Mark Clark’s career. (Somehow Monty’s rep survived Arnhem, too.)
The main arm of the team since about 1942 has been the artillery. But it’s undergoing a transformation, as it now has to displace faster to avoid being droned after one or two ToTs. Hence the British retiring the AS90 in favor of the Krauss-Maffei/Wegmann RCH 155. Hits like an M109, moves around like a Jeep-mounted four-deuce mortar.
I still kind of suspect that Arthur C. Clarke was correct when he predicted that future battles would consist of “dirigible missiles” remote-controlled from protected underground command posts. What still surprises me is that Clarke, who pretty much invented the whole idea of communications satellites in synchronous orbit, didn’t realize that those CPs might not be a hundred miles behind the FLOT. Rather, they might be clear back in the users’ home country.
That’s likely how this is going to end up. And troops on the ground may end up envying Quarlo Klobregny.
clear ether
eon
Could we please stop the constant sniping at Montgomery by US commenters. He undoubtably had faults, including an uncanny ability to piss off preening thin skinned Allied General Officers. The important thing was that he was seen as a winning commander following El Alamein and understood the importance of logistics in modern warfare. Furthermore he always tried to minimise casualties of his troops whenever possible.
With regard to Arnhem, it was a great idea stymied by poor planning; it wasn’t a bad idea to try to liberate more of the Netherlands and put a knife in the side of Nazi Germany. It would have saved a lot more civilians from the famine of Winter 1944 and is still remembered positively by the Dutch people to this day. It is difficult to explain the planning failures, not least of which were the lack of air support and the delay in the 82nd Airborne capturing Nijmegen bridge (definitely not as portrayed in ‘A Bridge Too Far’).
People also forget what was possibly his most important action with future consequences, in April 1945 Allied forces rapidly pushed forward to the Baltic coast, arguably preventing Soviet occupation of Denmark and a much more adverse starting point for the Cold War.
Paul, I fear that Montgomery earned every bit of the venom with which US commentators have for him.
His truly graceless conduct during the campaigns in Europe? The constant cutting-down of anything US? He’s remembered the way he is remembered here in the US for what he said and did.
Plug William Slim into his position for the European campaigns, and Americans would have had little or nothing to criticize in British leadership. Unfortunately, Montgomery and his ego wound up as Britain’s combat commander, and we’ve got what we all got.
Hell, if you ask me? I think Montgomery should have gotten a lot more criticism than he did. I think putting him where we did lengthened the war, and what should have happened is that the US should have been the northern flank of the advance into Germany with Britain heading into the Alps. That would have put most of the US forces there in northern Germany to be set against the most probable attack routes of the Soviet post-WWII forces, and where the larger US forces would have done the most good, as well as positioning them for better logistics.
The war would likely have been over sooner, with Montgomery on the southern flank. The overall deployment never made a damn bit of sense to me, given the size of the forces and the probable post-war defense requirements. Putting the US in Bavaria was… Nuts. BAOR never had the strength to oppose the advance through the North German Plain, and that should have been assigned to the US, period. We had two or three full corps in Germany for most of the Cold War, and relegating them to central and southern Germany was madness. The way we relied on BAOR, the Dutch, and Germany to defend the flattest, most tank-friendly terrain in the theater? LOL… Stupidity on stilts. Not to mention, the logistics of it all; the US being out at the end of the logistics coming in through northern Germany? Who planned that crap?
We will have to agree to disagree about Montgomery’s effectiveness, although I wholeheartedly agree about the superb leadership of Bill Slim. As a weapons related aside, Slim in his role of CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) had a very stormy relationship with Churchill over the un-adoption of Rifle No.9 aka the EM2 in 1951/52. The minutes of meetings diplomatically avoid recording the insults thrown around.
On the question of NATO disposition of forces, it may have been justified as some sort of cunning plan involving a trip wire concept, resulting in the use Tactical Nuclear Weapons as soon as possible, to counter the perception of being outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact forces. The reality was probably it was just a post war reflection of troop disposition in 1945 and nobody wanted to fund the mass relocation of troops and assets.
This is an inarguable point, yet incomplete.
The unpleasant reality is that while tactics do follow weaponry, the weaponry tends to follow your conception of how you fight.
This is what led to the rather massive difference between the German and Allied schools of infantry combat. The Germans conceived, correctly I believe, that firepower trumped everything. The Allies, particularly the Americans, believed in the entirely unsupported delusion that the individual rifleman trumped everything. Thus, the US fascination with the Garand, and the German steadfast belief in the MG34/42.
Who was right? Well, we could ask all the Allied infantrymen who were forced to go up against the German infantry when their supporting arms weren’t there, but then most of those are filling rather large mass graves on the old Eastern Front. I suspect that they’d have preferred better, more realistic tactics and weapons over the inadequate ones they were handed to try and improvise around.
So, there’s a lot of truth to what you say, but also an awful lot of “Yeah, but…” available to quibble over.
Raw fact is this: Each and every skirmish and engagement in every single war that ever was consisted of a “learning opportunity”. If you learned, you lived. If not, you died. All too many of the people running the game at any remove above about battalion were very bad learners, and that’s how things like the Garand happened. If the US Army had realistically looked at what went on during WWI, they’d have done what the Germans did, concentrated on light, portable firepower, and gotten themselves something conceptually closer to the GPMG long before they spent a thin dime on new individual weapons.
Unfortunately for all too many infantrymen, that wasn’t what happened.
Its not just the Eastern Front. Absence of US artillery and air support also dominated the fighting at Hürtgenwald (Huertgen Forest) on Germanys western border with Belgium.
When I mentioned it as a “real” example of German infantry against US infantry, the US response was claiming no knowledge about Hürtgenwald. Notwithstanding its being mentioned beside the Battle of the Bulge at the WW2 memorial on Washington Mall.
I accept if someone thinks that German machine gun doctrine was utterly wrong. But simply ignoring actual events is very disappointing.
I have the misfortune to be a (somewhat…) high-functioning autist. I see something that interests me, I am forced to dig into everything I can about it.
I was handed an M60 machinegun as a private. At the time, that was THE weapon we Combat Engineers had; there wasn’t anything else. They’d taken our 90mm recoilless rifles, we weren’t authorized mortars, and we also weren’t given access to the fire control nets or provided with forward observation teams.
So, the M60 was it. Most of our missions were at sites forward of the infantry or armor outfits, and you knew that the only thing that you had to answer the enemy with was that weapon. It was emphasized; if you ever went back and looked at the annual competitions they held for 9th ID, back in the day? The machinegun trophies mostly went to the 15th Engineer Battalion, because… Reasons. Good ones.
Now, being the good little autist that I am, my exposure to the M60 as gunner meant “Learn everything…”, and what I found was that there were huge, gaping holes in the material. Which led to me doing all sorts of reading and studying the subject, which was where I encountered the German school of machinegunnery. I was able to talk to actual German veterans who’d used the MG34/42 in combat, and they were able to provide just enough clues that when I compared what I had been taught about “how to use the machinegun” on active duty in the Army, there were considerable discrepancies
That’s how I came to the subject, and arrived at my opinions on the matter. The Huertgen Forest battles were things I actually studied and looked at through the eyes of men who’d been there, some of whom I was privileged to talk to.
When I did that, there was a dawning sense of horror with it all. I realized then that nobody in the Army had really bothered to capture what those men died to learn, and that the vast majority of the lessons we’d paid for in blood were simply ignored by all the “experts” who ran small arms procurement/doctrine.
That was rather depressing, I have to tell you. I still wince, remembering talking to some of the guys who survived that period. Many of them really didn’t realize just how badly they’d been served by doctrine, training, and their equipment. Some did; they were emphatic that they’d abandoned “the book” and done what they’d found to work, but the thing was, if you went and looked at the post-WWII “book”, not a damn bit of their experience had been captured or recorded.
If it had, they would have done things far differently than they did, when it came to replacing the M1 Garand.
That study Ian references merely documents the things actual combat soldiers have been saying since about 1916. It’s a reality; line-of-sight and terrain masking mean that whatever you see of the enemy, it’s going to be close-in and fleeting. Designing, procuring, and then issuing someone a weapon that is intended to target anything past 300m or so is a severe disservice, because all the things that you need in a weapon like that are nearly diametrically opposed to what the soldier actually needs for the close-in fight that he will be presented with 99% of the time.
And, if you’re going to be dealing with things beyond 300m? You really should be addressing those targets with area-fire weapons. Period. You see one guy out in that range band, and the odds are absolutely overwhelming that there are more of his friends around him that you’re not seeing. One shot, one kill? Yeah; great. You just let 9 more get past you, unscathed.
What’s really interesting is that when you go back and read the old tactical manuals before the machinegun, they mostly said the same thing: You used volley fire on long-range targets because that was what worked. You were advised not to have individual riflemen fire on things that they spotted out past your normal range, because of that “…probably more of them out there…” thing.
At least, that’s what the experienced officers wrote down. There’s a memoir I remember reading, written by some British major who’d had long experience on the Northwest Frontier in India, and it was his contention that while the enemy often wanted you to “waste ammunition” on them, and made great game of luring British and Indian troops into firing on them, there wasn’t a lot to be wasted by lobbing a company or battalion’s worth of fire on some hillside where one Pathan had been spotted; you were fairly likely to hit something, and if nothing else, it was good for morale.
A committment to learning knowledge that directly pertains to your vocation is called ‘autism’ now? Didn’t it used to be called ‘commendable dilligence’? You’re a lecture in the flesh not a Greta Thunberg retread.
Would you? What.
I have an unfortunate tendency to “what if” most questions. Unfortunate because it’s annoying to most serious people. What if there were a double barreled weapon for close in and distant targets. Say a 30 carbine selective fire with a small semi auto grenade launcher for distance. Beyond 200-300 gets a 25mm(?) grenade for a bit of area leaving high volume and controllable 30 for close in. This idea is almost certainly annoying to people on this board, but I don’t have enough background to know why.
Similar is if the Winchester WSL 351 or 401 of 1905-7 had been necked down (as the French tried) to a light bullet 276 caliber instead of the 30 carbine back when the Peterson and Garand were being developed. Assault rifle in the mid 30s. The vision wasn’t there of course.
My actual question to this board is where to find decent discussion on different concepts that didn’t make it. These are not concepts I’m developing, just ideas I find interesting.
Hydraulic delayed blowback for rifles based on artillery type recoil systems. Piston in direct line with the bolt and chamber that has a tight fit for the first 1/4 inch or so before the piston clears into a larger chamber allowing movement. On paper could be simple and strong. Seems like something that would have been looked into in the 1890s to early 1900s.
Pendulum blow back submachinegun with the bolt at 90 degrees from the chamber. Pivot 1/2 inch below chamber with bolt mass 3 inches below pivot. 6 to 1 ratio letting the 1/2 pound bolt have the effect of a 3 pound bolt in direct line as in normal SMGs. Seems like something that would have been looked at in the interwar period.
Liquid propellant rifles for some time in the future when tech allows. Inert bullet in chamber with bipropellant injection. Nitrous/propane having about twice the energy of powder would have about 14 grains pushing 55 grains to 3300 ft/sec. Pint of propellant per 500 rounds. No residue or cook offs. Not for today, and extremely dangerous, but 20-40 years from now?
@redneck,
The problem with your first idea has already been laid to rest with regards to the XM-25, and that itself was the vestigial remnant of both the SPIW and OICW programs.
Think of it like a skeet shooting situation: You have your nice, fast-handling skeet shotgun, but you want to be able to take out flocks of ducks, so you bolt on a punt gun. Then, you hand the combination off to your shooter, and are surprised when he can’t hit his skeet shots and the punt gun isn’t working for the flocks, either…
The basic flaw in the premise is that you’ve completely misunderstood what is going on in combat. You want an area weapon? You need payload or multiple small rounds delivered rapidly. You will not get area weapon effects from a man-portable single-shot grenade launcher in 25mm. The payload doesn’t work at that size in single-shot mode; you need to be firing it from a belt-fed.
Or, you could just use a mortar or recoilless rifle and deliver some real payload with them.
25mm grenades may work, if they ever get guidance packages down small enough and improve the base energetics for the payloads. Until then, they’re a “nice idea that doesn’t work”.
The reality here is that the individual weapon at the infantry level is a close-in weapon that has to be, to coin a term, “wieldly”. The amount of crap we’re already bolting on is a problem; adding a whole new weapon to the equation like we did with the M203 is just plain stupid. I never, ever liked the M203 as a shooter or an armorer: They sucked. The stand-alone grenade launcher idea was always better, and they should have stuck with the M79 all along, in my opinion, just making it easier to carry and handle.
Which you will note, they did with the replacement for the M203. A weapon far more often encountered in the “stand alone” mode than the mounted on a rifle one…
Carbines need to be able to carbine, and that means they’re encumbered with the minimum amount of bullshit.
The grenade launcher bolted on? That was always some dumbass in a lab going “Wouldn’t it be cool if…?” and then inflicting the resultant abortion on the troops. It has never worked, and likely won’t work at all until there are some fundamental changes in the base technologies behind them.
I forget who the hell it was, but there’s a white paper out there that lays this stuff out oh so very clearly, describing how much explosive/fragmentation has to be delivered for various effects. If you look at the figures and do the math…? You really wouldn’t put a dime into anything under about 40mm, and even that’s sort of questionable. You start seeing effect at around what a 60mm mortar can deliver, and if you want to do direct fire? You’d be way better off with a product-improved 84mm Carl Gustav.
I had a guy who was on the OICW test team working for me, for a bit. The way he described the practical effects of the then-20mm grenade they were trying to make work? It was lovely, and all, to be putting grenades in windows that would then blow up, but… The actual delivered effect was effectively useless. The itty-bitty grenade would blow up, and the targets downrange would look like they’d been sandblasted rather than actually penetrated. If you need to fill your average-sized room with fragments and blast effect that will actually stop the occupants from fighting anymore? You need something on the order of at least a 60mm mortar round or a round out of a Carl Gustav. That stops fights; the itty-bitty grenady thingys do not. Not with the tech we can afford today.
Leave the carbine work to carbines, don’t encumber them with excess “nice to have” bullshit, and then use actual weapons with effect, like machineguns, mortars, and the recoilless rifle.
That’s my opinion, and I’ll stick to it. The XM-25 crap is a useless pipedream resulting from massive idjitry in the procurement department. You’ll note that the stuff people like me were actually asking for, like product-improved 40mm HEDP never got developed or procured because they didn’t want actual useful programs to exist, lest their little pet project suffer from competition.
We know how that worked out. There still isn’t a decent 40mm round being issued, and the XM-25 was an utter and complete failure.
So what about rifle grenades? The ones where you put a special blank into the rifle, stick a grenade that looks something like a hand grenade on the muzzle, and then shoot the grenade to some distance. Ian is constantly showing us the mounts for rifle grenades, but I don’t think I’ve ever run into an account of one used in combat. Which likely means there’s a good reason not to use them in combat, but I’m curious to hear your thoughts. At least they don’t encumber the weapon the way a bolt-on grenade launcher does. On the other hand if you mount a grenade and then suddenly have to fire an ordinary bullet you’re out of luck. Still, maybe someone could be assigned grenade duty as part of a team where the other guys are watching his back, and maybe that would only be for certain operations where lobbing grenades to some distance is expected. Or maybe that’s just too much specialized training for too narrow a mission.
“(…)don’t think I’ve ever run into an account of one used in combat(…)”
https://www.militaryfactory.com/smallarms/detail.php?smallarms_id=893 claims ENERGA dubbed M28 was used by U.S. forces in Korean War. My cursory search did not unveiled account of use, so further research might be required to unveil one.
“(…)mount a grenade and then suddenly have to fire an ordinary bullet(…)”
FN did develop TELGREN which can be used with normal rifle ammunition https://defensionem.com/fn-herstal-bullet-thru-telgren-rifle-grenade/
I’m sure rifle grenades have been used in combat by someone, somewhere. It just seems rare.
That FN development is nice, but what would really make them attractive is if the rifle grenade were not some sort of special, delicate thing but robust, cheap, and capable of being used as an ordinary hand grenade (and issued as the normal hand grenade). Pair that with an electronic sight with built-in rangefinder and ballistic drop calculator (and a grenade-mode button), and soldiers might actually be able to lob one into a window at 100 meters after only modest training.
Of course this would be quite a development project, if feasible at all. (The electronic sight is the easy part; “robust and cheap” is the hard part.)
It’d be my opinion that rifle grenades are among those items that I would term “Nice try, but doesn’t actually work”
Note that the military I served in did not use them.
The Swiss and French were probably the most enthusiastic users, and I will point out that while they had the most of them on issue, they never conducted a modern war against competent opposition.
My objection to the rifle grenade is that the requirements for them mean you’re no longer really issuing a carbine to the troops; the StG57 is what it is largely because it’s a literal Swiss Army knife of an individual weapon, optimized as individual weapon, grenade launcher, and light machinegun. It does none of those things particularly well, and that’s why the StG90 looks the way it does.
The other thing with rifle grenades is that the grenades themselves are rather prone to damage, fussy in operation and maintenance, and a major distraction for the troops. Given the choice between 9 guys armed with rifle grenades and 8 riflemen plus a Carl Gustav operator? I’ll let you have the former, and I’ll take the latter. The Carl Gustav is lots more useful in all regards, and far more likely to actually hit.
The rifle grenade is something like its ancestor from back in the 1700s: Looks good, sucks ass in actual use.
Not to mention the added logistical costs stemming from having to build reinforced individual weapons that can handle the damn things, which when put up against their actual efficacy as weapons…? The juice ain’t worth the squeeze, in my humble opinion.
I’d vote for “No rifle grenades” and ubiquitous Carl Gustav-class weapons, thankyouverymuch.
I fired a 25mm one off a SA80. At stuff, which did indeed, set on fire.
“(…)objection to the rifle grenade is that the requirements for them mean you’re no longer really issuing a carbine to the troops;(…)”
Wait. Are you therefore claiming Onyks wz.89 already described here https://www.forgottenweapons.com/rifles/wz-88-tantal/ is not carbine?
“(…)a double barreled weapon for close in and distant targets. Say a 30 carbine selective fire with a small semi auto grenade launcher for distance. Beyond 200-300 gets a 25mm(?) grenade for a bit of area leaving high volume and controllable 30 for close in(…)”
If you okay with 5,56 mm rather than .30 Carbine and 20 mm rather than 25 mm, then K11 https://www.militaryfactory.com/smallarms/detail.php?smallarms_id=937 will fit description.
“(…)instead of the 30 carbine back when the Peterson and Garand were being developed. Assault rifle in the mid 30s(…)”
Carbine (uppercase C) unless intentional show of disdain w.r.t. Carbine Williams.
Pedersen unless intentional show of disdain w.r.t John D. Pedersen.
“(…)Hydraulic delayed blowback(…)”
Not as stand-alone principle of operation and not 1890s, but was used it some fire-arms, for example Serbu BFG-50A https://modernfirearms.net/en/sniper-rifles/large-caliber-rifles/u-s-a-large-caliber-rifles/serbu-bfg-50a-eng/ …To decrease felt recoil and extend service life of the weapon, it is equipped with muzzle brake and integral hydraulic buffer which slows down recoil of the bolt group…
“(…)Pendulum blow back submachinegun(…)”
Pendulum was part of much earlier design, namely Salvator-Dormus-Maschinen-gewehr from 1893 https://guns.fandom.com/wiki/Salvator_Dormus_M1893 It allowed to adjust Rate-of-Fire. Observe this design was only used in stationary roles (fortress or naval).
“(…)Liquid propellant rifles(…)Nitrous/propane having about twice the energy of powder(…)”
Yet in 1942…1943 experimental liquid-powered 14.5 mm test weapon was created in Soviet Union, see photos https://military-exotic.blogspot.com/2024/02/1942-1943.html
It used керосин (probably AVGAS in U.S. parlance, though I am not 100% sure about that) and HNO3. Note that they did not just ignited said parts, but also pumped them as bullet goes down barrel. Thus so-called curve was flattened [curve here meaning plot of positionofbulletinbarrel-vs-pressureinbarrel] and thus more force imparted at bullet [more pressure near muzzle than whilst using normal powder]. Said weapons using PTRD barrel proved capable of muzzle velocity no less than 2000 m/s.
Interesting info and links, thank you. I meant no disrespect to Carbine Williams or Pederson. fingers disconnect from brain.
These are not Ideas I am going to defend beyond misunderstandings when I am unclear.
For hydraulic, I was thinking of an actual hydraulic lock that delays opening the bolt until pressure drops rather than as a buffer. Would only make sense if it offered some serious advantage over existing weapons. Such as less machining or more reliable operation or softer shooting for a given caliber, or even possibly less weight. None of which may come to pass.
I didn’t realize that the pendulum concept went back that far, though it’s not shocking. I had a much simpler concept in mind for a lightweight 9mm or 45 sub guns. That full power Austrian blowback is intimidating.
I had read of artillery investigation into liquid propellants that wasn’t ready for real world due to various problem, some dangerous. Unaware that the Soviets had tried that far back, while in a war for survival no less. My curiosity comes from my connections to liquid propellant rocketry. I suspect that production weapons with liquid propellant may be like Fusion energy that is always 2 decades out
Ignore, him… Speak to me of Hydraulics!
Other than an incompressible fluid creating a simple* controllable lock, what is there to say?
*in theory
Sheer stress, some sort of stuff ring Elon Musk the twat. I don’t get why we don’t just use drones to drop ram jet drones. They aren’t drones anyway Sha’sheds… MOOOO! V1’s. Weeeeeee!
Ram jets don’t work at all below Mach 0.3 or so. And don’t actually get efficient until supersonic. Inlet aerodynamics get complex, finicky, and expensive if going for any variation in velocity.
“Ram jets don’t work at all below Mach 0.3 or so.(…)”
Not problem if carrier can attain such velocity or enough altitude to let dropped item to reach that velocity, see test of Solid Fuel Integral Rocket Ramjet from BQM-34 https://www.navair.navy.mil/news/cars-rockets-evolve-Navys-ramjet-test-proves-game-changing-potential/Wed-05072025-1638
@ Daweo 8:45 am
For larger and longer ranges at a fixed operating Mach number, ramjets can be made to work. D-21 launched from SR-71 historically. I’ve been more interested in the acceleration engines where ramjets are useless. Used to blog about the stuff a couple of decades back. Not current now.
Ejector ramjets might be feasible at the lower sizes we are discussing here. Transonic Isp is likely in the 300-500 range so that 3 seconds to reach 1,000 meters would consume, guessing at drag, a pound or so of propellant. Somewhat less than a rocket for the same job but much more complex engine cycle.
Getting the payload on target that Kirk thinks necessary in an infantry loadout seems chancy. The Carl Gustaf with two men seems to be 5-6 rounds for 50 or so pounds. Interesting to think of how to keep the close in (<300 m) firepower while simultaneously having the distant heavy hitting when necessary.
Jealous of Musk for being rich and pushing expansion into space?
Can’t belive you talked to someone else Daweo my Russian sex bot. You bitch. Spank you.
Er… Ok. A Wankel engine, gun? Do gun bolts need to have bolts,and cartridges.
That might be a sci-fi premise. A reservoir of heavy propellant fluid with projectiles suspended in it like peas in your porridge. The weapon squirts a projectile of fluid and a projectile into the chamber and whoosh! Ignites the fluid and drops another alien from the planet of the Uggli Fukkahs. Real life applications of the notion might be a bit more dicey
It squirts ‘measure of projectile fluid’. Mea bad. Mea maxissima bad
“(…)Wankel engine, gun(…)”
You probably want Mk 18 Mod 0 grenade launcher https://guns.fandom.com/wiki/Mk_18_Mod_0_grenade_launcher which does …uses a rotary split breech, which allows for straight through feeding of ammunition, eliminating the need for a reciprocating bolt…
“(…)Do gun(…)need to have bolts(…)”
This will depend on your definition, see https://www.cartridgecollector.net/cartridge/556-x-30-hughes-lockless/ which does use sliding sleeve to complete the chamber. Does that count as bolt?